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FOREWORD

In just half a decade, Central Asia has gone from being a
backwater known only to selected scholars to one of the most closely
watched spots on the globe. In the words of The Economist, “Barely
six years after emerging from the rubble of the Soviet Union . . . .
attracted by substantial proven reserves . . . and by the promise of
fabulous wealth from the oil and gas fields that have yet to be
explored fully, the world’s oil bosses are falling over themselves to
1
secure a piece of the Caspian action.”
Central Asia is a region of potential wealth; it is a region of
potential turmoil. It is characterized by multi-ethnic societies—the
product of centuries of transmigration and political exile, separated
by boundaries drawn by central authorities in part to “divide and
conquer” the indigenous population and turn them on one another
(rather than Moscow). Central Asia is the last remnant of the Soviet
model: paper constitutions that promise much but assure little, line
and block charts for administrative procedure that mask rule by an
oligarchy of the few supporting the one man in charge; and “multiple
militaries,” with several agencies possessing armed forces, each with
its own mission, its own military, and its own agenda.
Lieutenant Colonel Dianne L. Smith examines the development
of post-Soviet Central Asian armed forces, Central Asian efforts to
guarantee their national security, and the implications for the
United States of this struggle. She cautions that the United States
use its influence and its military-to-military contact programs
judiciously. This is a region of great instability, with massive
infusions of energy wealth just beyond the horizon. If these states
can create viable methods to ensure domestic and regional security,
this wealth may produce prosperity and secure well-being for their
citizens. If these states fail to create institutions to preserve their
national sovereignty, the new century could presage long, lingering
chaos and waste on a grand scale. One need only look south to
Afghanistan for such a model.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Central Asian states preferred to ensure their security
through the unified command of the Commonwealth of
Independent States and collective security. But, the
decision of Ukraine, and then Russia, to create independent
republican forces compelled the Central Asian states to
create their own armed forces. Depending on their relative
success at developing viable military forces, each state has
compensated with other tools of national power. Budgetary
considerations and assessment of real-world threats have
compelled each state to make hard decisions concerning
relative investment in conventional armed forces, security
forces, or border guards. To avoid further dependence upon
Moscow, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have
attempted joint security ventures. Tajikistan remains
dependent upon Russian troops and Central Asian
peacekeeping forces. Turkmenistan hopes that a policy of
nonalignment and neutrality (albeit with active support
from Russia) will prove successful. Although they are
willing to let Russia assert some authority within Central
Asia, each seeks alternative sources for security.
The United States supports the development of Central
Asian armed forces to ensure that collective security is just
that—collective. Indeed, America has a strong interest in
ensuring that Central Asian militaries develop to relative
sufficiency so that they are players in the game and not just
tools of Moscow.
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BREAKING AWAY FROM THE BEAR

Shymkent, Kazakstan, Sept. 15—Paratroops from the United
States joined soldiers from five other nations today in a scenic
display of long-range airborne deployment skills, in an exercise
meant to shore up the independence of the former Soviet
republics of Central Asia. . . . Marine Gen. Jack Sheehan,
commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the first of 540
paratroops to jump from the C-17 cargo planes, pronounced the
initial phase of the exercise a success and said it proves “there is
no nation on the face of the earth we cannot get to.”
The Washington Post,
September 15, 19972

INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade a significant body of literature has
redefined “security.”3 With the end of the Cold War, many
scholars criticized the traditional, narrow definition of
security and focused on issues other than military affairs,
such as population growth, environmental degradation,
ethnic conflict, crime, drugs, and migration. Nevertheless,
the focal point of a nation’s security remains its ability to
field a military force capable of defending its territorial
integrity, safeguarding its national interests, protecting the
lives and property of its citizens, and preserving its
sovereignty as an independent state.
Since independence, the five Central Asian states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan have created armed forces with varying
capability to perform these missions. Each has compensated for its military’s weakness with alternative tools
of national power and collective security programs. The
United States has begun programs in each Central Asian
state to assist in the development of these forces.
Washington supports this process to ensure that collective
security is just that—collective—and that the Central Asian
1

states are true players in the game and not tools of other
regional powers. The ability (or inability) of each new
republic to provide credible military force will have
long-reaching consequences for the Central Asian states,
their neighbors, and the United States.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
The Central Asian republics were an accident of history.
In order for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to break up the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), their three
leaders had to avow the legitimacy of each of the 15
republics making up that union to declare its sovereignty
and assert its independence. Independence, however, met
with mixed reactions. The Baltic States embraced
independence. The Central Asian States broke out into a
cold sweat at the thought. Their leaders recognized that
central among the many challenges facing them was that of
providing for national security and pushed for inclusion
within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Several options for providing security in Central Asia
existed: collective security, reliance on domestic national
armed forces, reliance on a patron (either regional or
extra-regional), international guarantee of neutrality, or
regional cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
The first, most obvious solution was to create a collective
security arrangement within the CIS, which had replaced
the USSR. This they did. Yet, 8 years later, as that forum
meets, analysts contend “the choice is stark: Should its
members paper over its evident collapse or try to start over
from scratch?”4 Why has this organization failed to provide
security for its members?
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
In December 1991, the CIS was created5 and the Joint
Commonwealth High Command replaced its Soviet High
Command predecessor. The republics had one-by-one
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declared independence, but they still did not think of
themselves as entities beyond the collective. Their
“national” security was that of the CIS. The two bulwarks of
that security were to be a unified command and a collective
security agreement. The member states saw no need (nor
did they acknowledge their innate inability) to create
independent armed forces.
Cracks in the System.
Serious problems soon occurred in both the unified
command structure and the collective security agreement.
Indeed, initial debate over the nature of CIS armed forces
mirrored core arguments over the nature of the Commonwealth itself and the role of the Russian Federation as de
facto leader. 6 Article 6 of the agreement to form a
commonwealth envisioned a common strategic- military
space under a unified command, including unitary control
over nuclear weapons, but refrained from specifics. Most
Central Asian states assumed that some type of unified
defense structure would replace the Soviet High Command,
but manning, mission, and deployment would remain
basically the same.
Moscow’s proposed structure for the armed forces’
unified command immediately put the issues of equality
and sovereignty into question. Two schools emerged. The
first7 accepted the need to decentralize both control over and
ownership of the new republican armed forces. Republican
forces would be subordinate to their respective defense
ministries and heads of state, not the CIS.8 The other
school9 rejected any power sharing and envisioned a truly
unified (edinyye) armed forces—reflecting the attitude that
the CIS was merely the USSR with new letterhead paper
and that “the republics had commitments and obligations,
not rights of ownership and control.”10 The final compromise
created two CIS commands: one for the Combined Strategic
Armed Forces such as nuclear weapons, strategic air forces,
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etc., and a Joint Supreme High Command bureaucracy in
Moscow to control the remainder.11
When the CIS Joint Command failed, it was not
unexpected. The Russian Federation (even though it had
retracted to Muscovy’s borders of the 1650s) regarded itself
as the successor state to the USSR. As such, it assumed
ownership of strategic assets and expected the other states
to accept its lead. As the reality of independence set in, the
new republics began to refuse to fall into this subordinate
relationship. Eight states agreed on a common military oath
for CIS strategic forces, but Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
refrained.12 Commissions set to consider the fate of the
Caspian Sea Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet ran into major
obstacles as states demanded their part of the pie instead of
total return of all assets to Moscow.13 Ukraine began to
question Unified Command (that is, Moscow’s) control over
nuclear weapons on its territory. Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and
Moldova announced their intent to create their own armed
forces and opt out of a Unified Command, regardless of
which structure was approved.14 After 18 months the joint
command was dissolved, and a smaller CIS Joint Staff with
reduced responsibilities replaced it.15 The strategic forces
commander position was abolished, and the position of
“Chief of the Joint Staff for CIS Military Coordination” was
created in its place.16
The Tashkent Security Agreement.
Even with a unified command infrastructure, the states
understood that “what was once a single strategic space was
broken up, and today none of the newly formed states is
capable of fully solving the problem of its own security
through its own efforts alone.”17 Collective security was the
solution, but early efforts to produce a collective security
pact were unsuccessful. The Tashkent summit of May 1992
was a make-or-break meeting for the CIS. The first three
CIS summits of 1992 in Moscow (January 16), Minsk
(February 14), and Kiev (March 20) had failed to create a
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consensus on the form and substance of the new armed
forces or to reach any agreement on a general CIS military
budget, “the bedrock on which any significant CIS military
structure would have to stand.”18 Then, in a single day (May
15, 1992) in Tashkent, the attending heads of states adopted
13 documents.19 Most important was the signing of a
collective security accord, although it was predominantly a
political-military rather than a military agreement. They
also agreed on the joint use of airspace and of the Baikonur
and Plesetsk space-vehicle launching sites and reaffirmed
their desire to have border troops under a unified command.
They agreed to fulfill the USSR’s commitments with respect
to international treaties on chemical weapons and the
reduction of armed forces. Finally, they laid the groundwork
for CIS peacekeeping forces, to be used only with the
consent of all sides involved in a given conflict.
From the beginning, however, the agreements did not
produce a CIS collective security environment. The
Tashkent Accord (signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on May 15)
more resembled a Central Asian security pact than a CIS
security agreement. For varying reasons, Ukraine, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova did not accede to the document.20
Without Ukrainian participation, initial Russian interest
waned. The treaty did not go into effect for nearly 2 years,
and even then, bureaucratic, financial, and legislative
barriers have blocked implementation of some provisions
altogether. The treaty did not fulfill its political goal of
preventing the process of military disintegration and
restoring mutual trust among the signatories.
The treaty also fell short of its military goals. Article 4 of
the treaty provides for joint repulsion of “aggression,” but
does not set criteria that demand action. As such, Armenia
was unsuccessful in gaining signatories’ support repelling
alleged transgressions during its struggle with Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Until Karimov of Uzbekistan
protested and threatened unilateral action, the treaty was
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not even invoked to deal with cross-border incursions from
Afghanistan into Tajikistan.21
Even when countries acted, their response was limited.
Under provisions of the accord, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan did eventually supplement Russian forces
in Tajikistan, but troop numbers were small in comparison.
Central Asian states preferred to let Russian forces bear the
brunt of the burden of peacekeeping (or peacemaking) in the
region; they were also still unable to support deployed forces
beyond their own borders.
Acknowledging that the “times when a single viewpoint
[could be] foisted on everyone are gone,”22 Boris Yeltsin
proclaimed that Russia must look toward the creation of its
own national forces and seek to assure Commonwealth
security through bilateral ties with individual CIS members
as well.23 Such a sentiment was reluctantly endorsed, in
turn, by the Central Asian republics.24 The states of Central
Asia did not want to form independent armed forces and
were among the strongest advocates of maintaining some
type of unified command under Moscow.
The reluctance of the Central Asian states to undertake the
creation of their own militaries is not surprising, given their
lack of a significant ethnic officer corps on which to draw, their
interest in dedicating scarce economic resources to more
pressing needs, and their general appreciation that they
cannot effectively ensure their security independently.25

Nevertheless, once the Russian Federation decided to opt
for a national force, one by one the other CIS states were
forced to form their own as well.
Interest remains in greater economic cooperation, but
(aside from air defense) the CIS military structure is
moribund. As one analyst noted, “the only question is
whether to keep the respirator going.”26
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL
ASIAN MILITARIES
Each Central Asian state, therefore, has been forced to
develop national armed forces from the leftovers of the
Soviet Armed Forces. Each has faced serious challenges
while attempting to mold armed forces to meet its particular
needs, defend its borders, safeguard its citizens, and protect
its national security. Creation of armed forces has had less
to do with identification of threats to national sovereignty
and molding an armed forces to meet those threats, than
“making do” with what was left over from the Soviet Army.
Let us first examine that Soviet legacy and then trace the
challenges confronting each state in the formation of
indigenous armed forces. While many problems were
common, each state had to confront its own security
demands, perceived threats, geopolitical position, economic
dislocation, cadre resources, ethnic strife, and political
sensitivities. As a result, the ability of the countries to field
viable armed forces has been uneven, and states have been
forced to find other means to secure their sovereignty.
SOVIET LEGACY
The Soviet heritage of the Central Asian states has had a
major impact on each republic’s armed forces. The primary
factor molding Central Asian affairs is that the so-called
Soviet Socialist Republics making up the Union, although
given boundaries and state institutions mirroring that of
Moscow, were never meant to be self-supporting states—
politically, economically, or militarily. Each state is
supposedly the homeland of its titular minority (e.g.,
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan), but in reality, the “nation states”
of Central Asia suffer from the dysfunction that occurs when
territorial and ethnic boundaries do not coincide. 27
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Turkmenistan did not exist prior to the drawing of Soviet
republican boundaries. Stalin’s “cartographic exercises”
purposefully cut across nationalities, to “divide and
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conquer”; borders were drawn deliberately to generate
internal ethnic tensions, to make each republic a sort of
Matreshka doll with minorities inside minorities—all
dependent on Moscow.28 Central authorities meant these
borders as internal administrative control mechanisms; no
one dreamed the Soviet Socialist Republics would ever
become actual states. As a result, boundaries, drawn to fit
Stalin’s political purposes, did not match key terrain or bind
nations together.
All ties were vertical to Moscow; there was no horizontal
integration within Central Asia. Politically, each Soviet
Socialist Republic possessed a legislative and executive
infrastructure and a republican Communist Party chief,
appointed by Moscow, who became the de facto ruler when
the Soviet Union fell apart. There was no comparable
republican-level economic infrastructure to fall back upon.
Economically, the Central Asian economies were part of the
command economy run by the Five Year Plans, driven by
decisions from the center in Moscow, fed by a unified power
system, and funded by a common currency.29 When this
system broke up, it created great dislocation and financial
upheaval.
The republics possessed no independent military
structures, e.g., similar to the British Territorial Army
system, the German Wehrkreis, or an American state’s
National Guard. Soviet strategic considerations drove the
alignment of men, equipment, and materiel to the region
called “Soviet Central Asia.”30 Two military districts, the
Turkestan and Central Asian,31 provided the peacetime
infrastructure and wartime command and control for army,
navy, and air force units stationed in the region. Their
missions shaped the disposition, location, and manning of
Soviet units, garrisons, and facilities. The broad expanse of
desert and distant mountain ranges housed the Soviet space
center, nuclear test areas, research facilities for chemical
and biological warfare, strategic missile silos, top secret
research installations, and huge quantities of materiel
moved beyond the “Atlantic to the Urals” (ATTU) treaty
8

zone delineated under the terms of the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty.32 Yet it was pretty much “luck of
the draw,” the result of decisions by Moscow’s bureaucrats,
where troops, training sites, and installations were located.
Soviet security needs, not republican interests, shaped their
deployment.
Another prominent factor is what Dr. Jacob Kipp calls
the Soviet Union’s “multiple militaries.” In Soviet terms,
“armed forces” refers not only to troops subordinate to the
Ministry of Defense, but to a variety of other military forces
subordinate to other agencies, to include internal security
forces (MVD), committees of state security (KGB), railroad
troops, praetorian guards assigned to the Presidency,
border forces, etc.
Finally, Soviet post-World War II manpower policy
affected the development of Central Asian militaries.33
Moscow regarded military service as a tool to socialize
ethnic minorities, teach them Russian, break down
nationalist loyalties, submit them to political training, and
create the “New Soviet Man.”34 Ethnic Russians made up
barely half of the Soviet population but predominated in
high technology services (such as the Strategic Rocket
Forces and Air Forces) and security forces (e.g. the KGB
Border Guards). Slavs, especially Eastern Ukrainians,
dominated the career noncommissioned officer ranks. Slavs
also made up nearly 95 percent of the officer corps, although
very limited numbers of non-Slavic officers reached general
officer rank. Combat units included all 120-plus ethnic
groups of the Soviet Union, but Central Asians increasingly
found themselves segregated in noncombat support units
such as construction battalions or internal security forces.35
The victims of racial bias, Central Asian minorities often
found themselves the victims of dedovshchina (hazing by
senior conscripts) and barracks-slang ethnic slurs.
Each of the Central Asian republics has had to deal with
this legacy as it shaped an independent armed force. The
republics have met with relative degrees of success.
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TAJIKISTAN—RUSSIA’S BLACK HOLE?
Tajikistan’s armed forces have been the least successful;
they failed to defend the regime during the initial succession
crisis and, as a result, the country was wracked by civil war
and cross-border incursions for half a decade.
Tajikistan’s early days were similar to those of its
neighbors: independence declared following the 1991
Moscow coup; a new government formed under the former
communist leader, Nabiyev; security advisors to the
president identified; and a National Guard created
(December 24, 1991).36 The most significant decision to
shape Tajikistan’s early forces was Dushanbe’s declaration
that the main Russian force deployed in Tajikistan, the
201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), would not be
nationalized to form the basis of the new Tajik Armed
Forces. A subsequent visit by Russian Defense Minister
Grachev confirmed that the division would not be disbanded
or withdrawn, although local recruitment would increase
the proportion of ethnic Tajiks and all Russians serving
would be on contract.37 Instead, the 201st MRD would
remain in Tajikistan until at least 1999 in support of the
Tajik Army.38
Without that trained, well-equipped core, Tajikistan
was forced to rely on leftovers to form its conventional
forces, and leftovers they were: a mixture of internal
security, local militia (police), and KNB (KGB successor)
troops. The first five “battalions” were also unconventional,
formed from paramilitary Popular Front volunteers.39 The
Tajik legislature could not resolve the real issues stymieing
development of operational forces: a shortage of experienced
ethnic Tajik officers and noncommissioned officers, reliance
on Russian training facilities (of the 201st MRD), the
inability to enforce conscription, a nonexistent military
doctrine, and (the most crucial issue) lack of funds to pay for
such forces.40
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Efforts to create conventional forces in 1992 were
overwhelmed by the political, ethnic, and religious tensions
that were tearing the country apart: regional economic
disparities, breakaway provinces, fighting between
southern Uzbek and northern Tajik factions, radical Islamic
groups, and cross-border incursions by Afghan mujahedin,
arms dealers, and drug smugglers. 41 The resultant
bloodshed left over 50,000 dead and a half-a-million more
homeless refugees.
Any real efforts to create a genuine armed forces awaited
the appointment of (ethnic Russian) Colonel Alexander
Shishlyannikov as Defense Minister in January 1993.42
With Russian assistance, he gradually built a small force of
around 7,000 men who were organized into two motorized
rifle brigades, one mountain brigade, and one Surface-toAir Missile (SAM) Regiment.43 This force, however, was too
small and poorly trained to ensure Tajikistan’s security.
Failure to produce viable armed forces has produced a
security policy totally dependent upon the willingness of
other states to accept responsibility for Tajikistan and to
expend men, money, and materiel to prop it up. The
continued existence of the Rakhmanov regime depended
upon military support from the Russian Federation and
fellow Central Asian CIS members.
The Rakhmonov regime came to rely upon two external
armed forces: the Group of Russian Border Troops in
Tajikistan (GRBTT) and the Joint CIS Peacekeeping Force
in Tajikistan.44 Tajikistan lacks resources to maintain
forces along its 2,000-kilometer border. During the CIS Kiev
summit in March 1992, Tajikistan confirmed that Russian
Border Guards would maintain Dushanbe’s borders. In late
August 1992 a reorganization of former-Soviet border forces
districts occurred, and jurisdiction for the “southern border
of the CIS” was transferred to the GRBTT. Their mission is
challenging, for as one observer has noted,
Those soldiers dispatched to protect Tajikistan from “terrorists
and Islamic fundamentalists,” also became policemen charged
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with detaining drug runners, as well as immigration officers
dealing with returning refugees—and one person crossing the
border could easily be a terrorist, drug runner, and refugee all
at once. The border guards are poorly paid, serve in territory
better known to their opponents, and are surrounded by
trouble . . .45

After 6 years of local recruitment, however, the term
“Russian” border forces refers more to its chain of command
than its ethnic composition. Of the GRBTT’s approximately
18,000 men, today about 12,000 are Tajik. The remainder
are made up of some 4,000 Russians, Ukrainians, and
Belorussians and some 2,000 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
Uzbeks.46
Since May 1994, Russian border forces have been
complemented by a small “Border Troops of the Republic of
Tajikistan” to support the GRBTT. The three border
brigades then formed (and a fourth in 1995) are used
independently in rear areas and jointly with Russian forces
in the mountain regions. Tajik border guards are
commanded by a Russian officer. Given the choice, however,
over 80 percent of Tajik officers and warrant officers choose
duty in the Russian border troops because of the better pay
rather than service in their own national forces.47
The second external force to provide security to
Rakhmonov’s regime has been the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan (CCPFT), created under the
collective security provisions of the Tashkent accord after
nearly a year of wrangling. The original mission of the force
(to be comprised of one reinforced Russian battalion, two
Uzbek, one Kazakh and one Kyrgyz battalions) was to
conduct operations “to allow the new leadership in
Tajikistan to take the situation under control and stop the
excesses of gangs.”48 It was to separate warring factions and
safeguard the newly appointed coalition government.
Indeed, the 201st MRD was not part of the originally
designated force and was tasked to guard key installations
and military facilities.
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The Agreement on Collective Peacekeeping Forces
signed on September 24, 1993, by Russia and four Central
Asian states (Turkmenistan abstained) formally
established the Joint Command of the Collective
Peacekeeping Forces and authorized it to implement
decisions taken by the heads of respective states regarding
the use of these forces. Appendix 2 specified that Russia
would provide only 50 percent of the collective forces.
However, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan failed
to provide troops other than limited forces for border duty.49
The 201st MRD was drawn into the CCPFT once the
magnitude of the mission and the lack of resources became
apparent. It was not until October 1993 that an actual CIS
Collective Peacekeeping Force was finally dispatched to
Tajikistan.50 Russian troops from the 201st MRD were
joined by limited contingents from Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; all were commanded by a
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed
Forces.
Thus Tajikistan has remained totally dependent on
outside sources for its physical security. However, recent
political breakthroughts have altered this situation. In
April 1996, Tajikistan (along with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) signed the Shanghai Accord to
settle on-going border disputes with China. This relieved
the need for extensive border forces along the eastern
border. Second, the Tajik government in Dushanbe signed a
peace accord (the General Agreement of National
Reconciliation and Peace Establishment) in Moscow on
June 27, 1997, with Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the
Islamic opposition.51 If parliamentary elections are held
and the secular opposition is brought into the reconciliation
process, the need for external forces to provide security will
dwindle. It is likely that Dushanbe would then ask for a
reduction in Russian troop strength in country (or at least a
decrease in their visibility). It is likely that Moscow, which
has long regarded Tajikistan as a black hole sucking it dry,
will welcome such an initiative.
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These developments will not necessarily be followed by a
comparable build-up of Tajik armed forces, especially in a
period when the financial demands of sheltering returning
refugees, reinvigorating a shattered economy, and
reasserting domestic reins of power will take precedence.
The Tajik armed forces did not provide security in the past;
Dushanbe will not pump them up to provide security in the
future. Instead, if the reconciliation government is
successful, it will most likely attempt to integrate itself into
other Central Asian political, economic, and military
mechanisms, rather than trying to “go it alone” once
Russia’s patronage is diminished. 5 2 For example,
Rakhmonov in January met with the other four Central
Asian leaders in Ashgabat during which he worked to patch
up grievances with Uzbekistan and discussed common
concerns regarding the inter-Tajik settlement, the situation
on the Afghan-Tajik border, the status of Russian troops in
Tajikistan, and regional security. 53 Dushanbe will be
“behind the power curve” of regional integration but can
benefit from the previous labors of its neighbors.
KYRGYZSTAN—FROM REASONABLE
INSUFFICIENCY TO REGIONAL PARTNER?
Kyrgyzstan has always been a reluctant republic. It
declared sovereignty on December 12, 1990, the last Central
Asian republic to do so; in the all-union referendum on
preserving the union (held in March 1991) 95 percent of
voters (93 percent turnout) supported the union.54 The new
government in Bishkek originally made little effort to
establish a national military force, signing the Tashkent
Accord, giving strong support to the CIS unified command
movement, and relying on Russia’s 40th Army (headquartered in Almaty) to fund ex-Soviet forces in
Kyrgyzstan.55 Bishkek issued a decree establishing the
Kyrgyz Armed forces only (according to one official) when
“in May 1992 Akayev received a telegram from [CIS Defense
Minister] Shaposhnikov telling him to take control of the
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forces on Kyrgyz territory because the center would no
longer pay for them.”56
China was Bishkek’s major perceived threat because of
long-standing border disputes dating back to tsarist land
grabs and concerns over the treatment in China’s Xinjiang
province of ethnic Uighers who share an ethnic and
religious (Muslim) heritage with the Kyrgyz. Territorial
concerns waned with the signing of the border agreement in
April 1997, which included a number of confidence-building
measures and troop reductions within a 100-kilometer-wide
border area.57 Transnational threats continued, however,
from international drug smugglers, arms traffickers, and
refugees fleeing Tajikistan. Continued unrest in
Afghanistan and the specter of politicized Islam (especially
from the newly-emerging Taliban) were also seen as
threatening.
A small set of issues within Central Asia also existed
over which Kyrgyzstan could come to blows with its
neighbors, the most contentious being water rights.58 All
Central Asian water flows from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The two states argue that it is a “strategic product” that they
have the right to control, sell, or trade. It is not their fault,
they say, that Soviet policies created ecological catastrophes
“too late to solve” elsewhere in the region. “Uzbekistan’s
problems with the Aral Sea are not Kyrgyzstan’s
problem.”59 But Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors challenge the
assertion that it has the right to decide where and when
water should flow. The water issue may prove to be the
powderkeg of 21st century security affairs in the region.
Therefore, immediate attention when forming armed
forces focused on border guards, next on Ministry of Defense
(MOD) forces, and then on internal security troops. At
independence, the “Kyrgyz Border Guards Command”
(subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and commanded by
a Kyrgyz general officer) administratively replaced the
Kirghiz (Kyrgyz) Directorate of the former Central Asian
Border Troops district of the USSR KGB. But this was an
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act on paper, not a recognition of Kyrgyzstan’s ability to
defend its borders. Seven years later, the actual
responsibility still rests on Russian shoulders. In 1992,
when Almaty took over the ex-Soviet Eastern Border
District, Bishkek found the Border Troops on Kyrgyz
territory were without leadership, support, or even medical
supplies. Bishkek appealed to Moscow for help and under an
October 1992 bilateral treaty, Russia assumed responsibility for guarding Kyrgyzstan’s borders. A “joint”
Kyrgyz-Russian Border Troops Command was established,
commanded by a Russian,60 to patrol only the border with
China—not along “internal” CIS borders. The Group of
Russian Border Guards in Kyrgyzstan works for
Kyrgyzstan (but subordinate to the Russian Federal Border
Guard Service), financed 80 percent by Moscow and 20
percent by Bishkek. Border guards serve under contracts
set by a 5-year agreement with Moscow, although as the
result of recent recruitment, more than 60 percent of the
inductees into the “Russian” border forces are ethnic
Kyrgyz.61
Kyrgyzstan announced plans for conventional forces to
include Ground forces and an Air Force/Air Defense
Command and a National Guard to provide internal
security.62 Kyrgyz Armed Forces were originally (1992)
comprised of one division (one tank, one artillery, and one
infantry regiment) headquartered in Bishkek; 63 one
independent brigade for mountain warfare headquartered
in Osh; and three aviation training regiments.64 The army
forces have survived, but the aviation training regiments
have collapsed as Bishkek failed to maintain the Soviet
Union’s pilot training program for foreign students.
Bishkek’s primary military problem is cadre. Once the
unified command concept collapsed, Kyrgyzstan set up
regulations to create a conscript force of nearly 20,000—a
target it has not been able to meet. Within a year it was
apparent that these plans were overly ambitious, but
Kyrgyzstan remained ambivalent about the structure and
size of its conventional forces. Today’s conscript force of
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12,000 men serves only in Kyrgyzstan. It is difficult to find
enough qualified officers to lead even that small number. Of
4,000 Soviet officers stationed in Kyrgyzstan “at the
inception,” about 90 percent were ethnic Russian. Not one
regimental commander and only one battalion commander
were ethnic Kyrgyz. Bishkek appointed an ethnic Kyrgyz as
its first Defense Minister,65 but the Chief of the Main Staff
was Russian. Additional appointments included experienced Russian and Ukrainian officers, with many Kyrgyz
officers appointed to deputy positions. Around 1,700 Kyrgyz
officers were serving outside Kyrgyzstan in 1991, many of
whom returned to serve in the new Kyrgyz forces.66 An
interstate treaty allows Russian soldiers to serve in the
Kyrgyz armed forces on a contractual basis through the end
of 1999. A 1994 agreement enabled contract Russians to
transfer to Russian or Kyrgyz service “without any
obstacles.”67 These provisions, however, have failed to halt
the hemorrhaging exit of skilled officers following the
collapse of the Kyrgyz economy.
For Kyrgyzstan, financing its own armed forces has been
truly daunting both in planning and execution. As one
minister noted, “in the past our job was to gather up the
money, send it to Moscow and keep the troops fed.”
Independent Kyrgyzstan has had to support forces on its
own territory, including retired officers’ pensions, from its
own budget.68 Financial considerations have been a major
factor in the sharp cut of personnel. Bishkek was woefully
dependent upon the defense sector. With the end of the Cold
War, this market collapsed. Russia would not buy from
Kyrgyz suppliers. This comes at a time when Bishkek also
faces up to $300 million in loans to Russia. Kyrgyzstan has
had to “sell” much of its defense sector to Russia to pay off
the loans—Moscow could well soon own a majority of the
industrial base in Kyrgyzstan as a result. Under such a
situation, there is little defense budget to pay for military
development—and priority goes to paying for border
forces.69
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What are the consequences for Kyrgyzstan’s security of
“outsourcing” border defense to the Russians and downsizing conventional armed forces?70 In a sense Kyrgyzstan
originally went beyond (actually below) “reasonable
sufficiency”—the Soviet doctrine which argued that a state
develop sufficient means to defend itself but not alarm its
neighbors—to “reasonable insufficiency”—insufficient
means to defend but so little national power that neighbors
ignore you altogether for more profitable targets.
Kyrgyzstan is tied economically and militarily to Russia.
It has allowed itself to be drawn into Russia’s fold by joining
the Quadripartite Customs Union (with Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan) because it is landlocked and is isolated
from major trade routes. It hopes that the new arrangement
will be a practical move to avoid customs taxes and retain
access to Russian markets.71 Kyrgyzstan has deferred to
Moscow in all major security and economic arrangements
because it felt it had little choice.
That has recently begun to change. Kyrgyzstan has not
built up its armed forces and remains militarily weak, but it
has begun working with its more powerful Central Asian
neighbors to compensate for that insufficiency and provide
national security independent of Russia. Kyrgyzstan has
slowly moved beyond dependency to Moscow in an effort to
avoid total subordination and because its most potent
threat was eliminated by the April 1997 agreement with
China. By the end of the decade, Bishkek has begun to bind
itself to its two most powerful Central Asian neighbors—
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—politically, economically,
and militarily on a trilateral and bilateral basis.
At the regional level, Bishkek helped form the
tri-national Central Asian Battalion (CENTRAZBAT)
being offered to the United Nations (U.N.) for peacekeeping
duties.72 Kyrgyzstan joined Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in
a trilateral customs union, signed the treaty on Deepening
Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Matters,73 and
joined them in the International Asian Investment Bank.
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Bishkek participates in tripartite biannual meetings of
heads of state, prime ministers, and defense chiefs.
Bishkek also has signed bilateral accords with both
states. In December 1996, Tashkent and Bishkek concluded
an eternal friendship accord and signed agreements on
military cooperation, hydroelectricty, natural gas
deliveries, a highway linking Uzbekistan to China, and
combating drug trafficking.74 Six months later Almaty and
Bishkek signed a series of agreements to create a joint
energy pool, finish building hydroelectric plants in
Kyrgyzstan, join uranium-processing efforts, and supply
Kyrgyzstan with oil; the two presidents then signed a treaty
on military cooperation establishing a common defense and
border space and providing for a joint air defense system,
cooperation between border units, and joint exercises.75
This regional integration is not without difficulties.
Bishkek does not want to be dependent on Moscow, but it is
tied to Russia through the CIS and the Quadripartite
Customs Union and still acknowledges Moscow to be the
“main strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan.”76 Unresolved
tensions exist within the region. Many Kyrgyz distrust the
ambitions of emerging power Uzbekistan with which
Kyrgyzstan shares the volatile Fergana valley. Memories
also linger of bloody riots in 1990 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan,
involving ethnic Uzbeks, in which hundreds if not over a
thousand people may have lost their lives. It was easier
before independence to direct disfavor and blame against
the Soviet Union than it is to find common ground once that
target disappears.
KAZAKHSTAN—PROMISE UNFILLED?
Is there a basis for Kazakhstan to form its own army? Is there
sufficient finance, a sufficient material and technical base, and
sufficient personnel for this? What is the level of preparation of
national cadres, and what is their present function in the army?
. . . Under present circumstances, three preconditions must be
met to form a well-prepared, complete army. They are finance,

19

weapons and cadre. If any one is lacking the army will be an
incomplete army.77
Baqtier Yerimet,
February 14, 1992

On paper, Kazakhstan had the greatest potential of
becoming a military power following independence. The
largest Central Asian state (2,717,000 square kilometers),
Almaty inherited nuclear weapons and substantial stores of
military equipment and hardware from the Soviet Army.
Major test facilities and the Baikonur space center were
located in Kazakhstan. The country was rich in mineral and
energy resources, especially oil.78 Its population of 17
million included 8-10 million ethnic Russians living
predominantly in the industrialized north. Yet, 7 years later
Kazakhstan struggles to build its armed forces, and
economic and political weaknesses have increasingly drawn
it, too, into Russia’s embrace.79
Although drastically different in size and power,
Kazakhstan shares many common problems with
Kyrgyzstan to include transnational threats from drug
smuggling, potential spillover from the war in Tajikistan,
and fear of politicized Islam and regional instability from
the Taliban’s struggle in Afghanistan.80 Kazakhs make up
only 40 percent of its population, with another 40 percent
Russian (although a declining number), and the rest a
mishmash of other Slavic, Central Asian, and Asian
minorities. Russian nationalists (e.g., Solzhenitsyn) talk of
breaking away northern Kazakhstan and returning it to
Mother Russia (where it belonged for centuries before
Stalin’s pen sliced it away). Therefore, Kazakhstan’s
security demands resemble a Rubik’s Cube of ever-changing
patterns and combinations in which border defense,
internal security, and conventional forces’ development
cannot be prioritized but demand equal, if fluctuating,
attention.
Almaty’s original assumption was that someone else
would be responsible for sorting this all out. Kazakhstan did
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not seek independence in 1991. Indeed, President
Nazarbayev’s call for a summit in Almaty to avoid
independence was a major element in forcing the leaders of
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to include the Central Asian
republics in the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kazakhstan
was very reluctant to give up the idea of a CIS unified
command and form its own armed forces.81 Soon after
declaring independence on December 6, 1991, Nazarbayev
established a National Security Council to formulate
legislation and doctrine directly affecting national
security. 82 A presidential decree of April 16, 1992,
transferred the bulk of the ex-Soviet 40th Army to the
jurisdiction of the Kazakhstani government, which
redesignated it the “All-Arms Army” within the context of a
CIS unified command.
Outside events forced Nazarbayev’s hand. On May 8,
1992, one day after Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of
the Russian Army (thus ending for all intents and purposes
any hope for a unified CIS command system), Nazarbayev
declared himself Commander-in-Chief of the “Armed Forces
of Kazakhstan” and established a Defense Ministry. The
State Security Council became the supreme decisionmaking body for national defense doctrine, security policy,
and senior military appointments under the chairmanship
of President Nazarbayev.83 Almaty placed ground forces, air
forces, air defense forces, and naval units84 under the
Ministry of Defense. Initial planning envisioned that
conscript forces should be at least 0.5 percent of the national
population (c. 83,000) but a shortage of funds and an
inability to enforce conscription consistently forced Almaty
to halve that amount. Current manning totals around
35,000 (ground forces, 20,000; air forces, 15,000; and naval
forces, 100).85
Restructuring of the internal security apparatus also
proceeded slowly. Nazarbayev created the Republican
Guard in March 1992, making it directly subordinate to
himself. The first two (of six) battalions were mustered in
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April 1992;86 it now numbers approximately 2,500 men.87 A
month later he designated a Kazakhstani Minister for
Internal Affairs, and Moscow transferred control of the
ex-Soviet Internal Troops to him for the mission of
maintaining public order and suppressing public
disturbances.88 Internal security forces now number around
20,000.89
Initially Kazakhstan envisioned its own border forces
under the National Security Committee (the indigenousKGB successor) guarding its 1,718 kilometer-long external
border. It nationalized the Border Guard Academy (located
in Almaty) and accepted technical training assistance from
Russia. Before long, however, it was evident these forces
were inadequate to stem the flow of drugs, weapons, and
refugees crossing the region, and that Almaty lacked the
resources to increase the size of its own forces. Kazakhstan
was forced to follow the path of other Central Asian
neighbors and accept the presence of Russian border forces
along its external border. By May 1995, however, Kazakh
border forces, now subordinated to a new State Committee
of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Protection of State
Borders90 (and assisted by a small [more administrative
than operational] “Group of Russian Border Troops in
Kazakhstan”), assumed responsibility for border security.91
Kazakhstan’s trump card was its inherited nuclear
weapons and delivery systems. However, any thoughts of
retaining Soviet nuclear weapons were short-lived. Almaty
lacked the funds and technical expertise to maintain and
safeguard the weapons. It could not easily integrate nuclear
weapons with its own military forces. Public revulsion at the
disastrous impact of various Soviet nuclear test sites on the
environment and health of the Kazakhstani population
could not be ignored. So instead, Almaty adopted a policy of
denuclearization and nonproliferation to divest itself of the
104 SS-18 missiles (ten warheads each) and 40 Tu-95 MS
strategic bombers (with 370 nuclear bombs) inherited upon
independence and transferred them to Russia.92
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Kazakhstan’s basic approach to security is to avoid
confrontation and to seek out collective security partners.
Almaty’s earliest security doctrine declared that no state
was its enemy, denied territorial claims on any of its
neighbors, and promised inviolability of existing
borders.93Doctrine stresses that although there is no
specific “threat,” territorial, economic, religious, ethnic, or
other tensions could escalate to war. Regional instability
and build-up of military potential by some nations (to
include weapons of mass destruction) remain sources of
potential danger. Kazakhstan must not confront these
threats by itself, but find collective security within the CIS
through joint utilization of strategic forces, a system of
comprehensive logistical and rear support, common efforts
to train and retain officer cadres, joint research and
development of military armaments, and development of a
joint military science and military art.94
Unfortunately, the early hopes for CIS military
integration and cooperation remain basically unfulfilled 7
years later, hampered by a lack of funds and a Russian habit
of signing documents without executing them.95 As a result,
although Kazakhstan remains in the CIS military
structure, it has sought alternative security partners to
help resolve the serious problems encountered in
developing conventional armed forces.
The critical shortage of national cadres remains a key
problem and deterrent to progress. At independence, 97
percent of Soviet officers in Kazakhstan were Russian. The
number of active duty Kazakh officers of all ranks in the
entire Soviet Army numbered only about 3,000, “not enough
to wash one’s hands with.”96 There was not a single Kazakh
general commanding a division, army, or military district
among them; colonels numbered only about 50, mostly in
support roles.97
Kazakhstan selected a distinguished ethnic Kazakh to
become the first Defense Minister,98 but his original deputy
defense ministers were Russian officers. As they departed,
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Kazakhstan had to seek out bright young Kazakh colonels
and promote them to general rank. Elderly General
Nurmagambetov was replaced as Defense Minister in
October 1995, by 41-year-old Lieutenant General Ailibek
Kasymov, a graduate of the Frunze Academy and former
Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, who had served since
November 1992 as Chief of the Main Staff.99 But, the
shortage of experienced, capable officers at all levels
remains a serious brake on military development.
Moscow did attempt to assist Almaty in stopping this
exodus; in July 1993 Moscow amended its Law on
Conscription and Military Service to allow Russian officers
and warrant officers serving in other republic’s militaries to
retain legal rights envisaged under Russian laws and freed
them from the obligation to take Kazakh citizenship or
swear an oath until December 31, 1993; this was later
extended to December 31, 1999.100 The outflow continued,
however, in part due to Russian perception that although
the Russians made up the majority of officers, only ethnic
Kazakhs were being promoted to the rank of general and
Russian resentment at serving under senior Kazakh
officers whose “rampant incompetence” resulted from
“promotions based on the factor of ethnicity and capability
for political maneuvering rather than expertise. . . . It is not
surprising that more and more ethnic Russians are
abandoning military service . . .” leading to cases where only
30-40 percent of the officer slots are filled.101
Military education remains a critical issue, especially for
noncommissioned and junior officers. Kazakhstan fared
better than some Central Asian states in the training
facilities it inherited, although the number was still small:
three military prep-schools, two military secondary schools
(as opposed to 34 in Ukraine), and two ex-Soviet Army
military schools—the Almaty Higher All-Arms Command
School (only six Kazakhs among the faculty and 84 Kazakhs
out of 1,000 students) and the Border Guards Academy.102
Under the September 1992 Russo-Kazakhstani Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance, Moscow agreed to
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train 500 Kazakhstani officers per year at its various
military academies.103 Kazakhstani pilots and navigators
are being trained at the Lepitsk Training Center in
Russia.104
Kazakhstan also has to face the question of language.
Few of the 60 percent of non-Kazakh populace spoke
Kazakh at independence, and the number of those ethnic
Slavs making up the officer corps (even those born in
Kazakhstan) who spoke Kazakh was especially low. The
desire to push the Kazakh language was hindered not only
by the embarrassing number of Russified Kazakh
intellectuals who did not speak Kazakh, but by the
knowledge that, until domestic military educational
institutions could be established, personnel would have to
continue to train in Russia—where they needed the Russian
language.105 Additionally, instructional materials, books,
training manuals, and so forth, inherited from the Soviet
Army were all in Russian.
Unable to exploit fully its energy resources or mend
easily the dysfunctions following the breakup of the Soviet
economic system, Kazakhstan has made hard decisions on
allocating limited financial resources, and the armed forces
have not come out the winner in budget battles. As a result,
Kazakhstan has had to relinquish several valuable
properties to Russian control that it had hoped to exploit,
and it has signed a series of bilateral and multilateral
agreements designed to draw Kazakhstan closer to Russia.
In May 1992 they signed an Agreement on Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance by which they
promised each other military assistance in case of
aggression against either state.106 In March 1994 they
signed 22 agreements, to include the lease to Moscow of the
Baikonur Cosmodrome (for an initial period of 20 years with
an option to extend a further 10 years) for $115 million
annually (to be deducted from Almaty’s debts to Russia). A
January 1995 agreement gave Russia continued access to
several missile test ranges, proving grounds, and military
communications sites in Kazakhstan.107 In January25

February 1995, Almaty and Moscow signed another series
of bilateral agreements,108 including an intent to “begin to
form unified armed forces.” The states would not form a
single armed force, but create a close alliance in which forces
would be unified, when necessary, to face a common threat
within a “mutual military and strategic space.”109 That
same year Kazakhstan joined the CIS integrated air
defense system and conducted a joint Russo-Kazakh
exercise.110 In January 1996, defense officials discussed
joint military cooperation, a draft agreement on
establishing a joint Russian-Kazakh regional security
planning organization, a Treaty on Collective Security,
closer cooperation in air defense and naval affairs,
technological cooperation, exchange training programs, and
the creation of joint Russian-Kazakh units, and then signed
16 agreements.111
Talk of integrating Kazakhstan’s armed forces with
those of Russia (even if only on paper) reflects a larger
political and economic dependence. Kazakhstan possesses
untapped mineral and energy wealth, but further
exploitation will require extensive investment in the
transportation infrastructure. Kazakhstan is landlocked,
and in the early days there was no other option but to use
Russian pipelines (with Moscow taking a huge cut off the
top) to get energy to external markets. Almaty joined the
Quadripartite Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and
Kyrgyzstan to gain access to Moscow’s international
markets and reestablish trade ties disrupted by
independence.112
However, this image of Kazakhstan being drawn into
Russia’s sphere is less striking in reality. Execution of
treaties remains spotty, including (6 years later) the
Tashkent Accord. Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev
visited Almaty in October 1997 to iron out tensions over
Russia’s failure to meet payment schedules for facilities’
lease in Kazakhstan, and Kazakh nationalists’ protests over
the presence of Russian forces in country.113 CIS support to
form joint peacekeeping forces under Russian command in
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Tajikistan was slow and limited, although Kazakhstan did
provide one battalion to guard a 56-kilometer stretch of the
Afghan-Tajik border. 114 Kazakhstan has signed CIS
agreements on the concept of military security (October
1993) and collective security (February 1995).115
Nazarbayev has sought to develop alternative security
dialogues within Central Asia, first with his call for a
Central Asian “Eurasian Union,” then with Kazakhstan’s
leadership role in the economic, political, and military
structures formed with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These
efforts include the 1994 agreement to form a “single
economic space” and an “economic integration program to
the year 2000” signed in 1996. For example, the three
planned to finance and build a gas pipeline linking the
Bukhara gas-bearing region (across Kyrgyzstan) with
Almaty. The program also includes construction of national
segments of the Trans-Asia-Europe fiber-optic communications line being developed.116 The success of these
endeavors is due (according to Russian analysts) to the fact
that all signed documents are scrupulously implemented,
problems are dealt with cooperatively, and none of the
leaders publicly accuses another of nonfulfillment—
common complaints about Russian-sponsored accords.117
That this union might evolve into military cooperation
cannot be discounted.
Ties with immediate neighbors have also been
developed. As a member of the Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO), Kazakhstan (and the other Central
Asian republics) seeks to improve ties with Islamic
neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and develop
economic cooperation and integration. Perhaps one day (at
least in the eyes of some) ECO may transform itself from an
economic union into a regional security forum (as has the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN).
Almaty has also expanded its security contacts as a
result of signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as a non-nuclear power. Russia, the United States,
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and Great Britain formally affirmed the security of
Kazakhstan. 118 China has also confirmed that its
abstention from the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of
their use against a non-nuclear state “applies to
Kazakhstan.”119
Thus, Kazakhstan’s original aspiration to develop viable
armed forces from the equipment and cadres inherited from
Moscow remains a promise unfulfilled. However, Almaty
has sought alternate political and economic means to
ensure its national sovereignty. Nazarbayev was the
earliest proponent of regional integration. Kazakhstan has
taken a leading role in developing economic, political, and
military ties with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
TURKMENISTAN—VICTORIAN GOVERNESS?
Turkmenistan seems to hope that in the short run it can
avoid conflict by keeping a low profile—a sort of “Victorian
Governess Syndrome.” In countless 19th century novels
(pick any Bronte sister), the poor, unmarried governess or
female relation keeps quiet in the background, dressing in
dark colors to avoid attention, placating everyone, always
helpful, avoiding the eldest son of the house, and praying
that her very anonymity would ensure her continued
residence. Except, of course, this governess knows that she
is secretly the missing heiress, and at some point in the
future she will come into a large fortune.
Turkmenistan is the second largest Central Asian state
(488,000 square kilometers), but it has a population smaller
than tiny Kyrgyzstan. Its porous borders to the south with
Iran and Afghanistan and to the west with the Caspian Sea
present a major security challenge to a country with only
four million people (and an additional two million Turkmen
residing over the border in war-torn Afghanistan). It, too,
possesses potentially huge energy reserves (especially
natural gas) and better access for pipelines and transport
linkups via the reviving “Silk Route” tying it to China and
Western Europe. Turkmenistan is unique, however, in its
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role as Central Asia’s maverick state, rejecting CIS
protection in favor of nonalignment and a bilateral
relationship with Moscow.
Following independence (October 27, 1991), the
government in Ashgabat was a firm supporter of a CIS
unified force until the pace of nationalization by Azerbaijan,
Ukraine, and Moldova forced it to create a Turkmen Armed
Forces organized into Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air
Defense Forces, and a Naval Coastal Defense Force formed
with the breakup of the Caspian Sea Flotilla. Of
approximately 300 Soviet units stationed in Turkmenistan
in December 1991, Moscow transferred about 200 to
Turkmen control; these included the former Soviet Army
Corps headquartered in Ashgabat (redesignated the
Independent All-Arms Army in August 1992) with two
all-arms divisions and an air defense brigade. By April
1993, about 60,000 soldiers were stationed inside
Turkmenistan (based on the former Soviet 52d Army), only
about one-fourth of whom were Russian, but financial
problems and immigration have cut that number now to
about 16,000-18,000.120
Manpower shortages are compounded by ethnicity
issues. Few Turkmen officers had reached senior rank
within the Soviet Army or attended the senior service
college. President Niyazov’s senior appointees have strong
backgrounds in security services rather than military
experience, perhaps less an inability to identify and
promote Turkmen field grade officers to general rank than a
focus on security threats to his personal rule and a
propensity for appointing old personal and Party friends to
his immediate circle.
Military education has also been a problem. No military
schools or officer academies existed in Turkmenistan upon
independence. In the short term Ashgabat has sent some
cadets abroad for training and educated other junior officers
at a new Military Faculty of the Turkmen State University
in Ashgabat. In September 1993 the first Turkmen Military
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Academy opened in Ashgabat which offered a 4-year
program to train armor, air force, logistics, and communications lieutenants. The first class of 75 lieutenants
graduated from the Turkmen Military Academy during the
summer of 1996; 200 graduated in 1997.121 No higher
schools yet exist, but Ashgabat currently sends army
officers abroad to Russia, Turkey, the United States, and
Pakistan for additional training. Navy and Air Force
officers attend schools in Ukraine, Pakistan and Turkey.122
Turkmenistan did not hold its first full-scale military
exercise until October 1995.123
Materiel remains a problem, although on paper the
Turkmen Army possesses 500 T-72 tanks and the Turkmen
Air Force has 171 operational fighters, trainers, and air
defense aircraft on hand and 218 in storage.124 But, “active”
inventories do not reflect the impact of maintenance levels
or spare parts availability. In fact, Turkmenistan has
systematically disposed of excess Soviet equipment
deployed or stockpiled on its territory, including some 500 of
the 1,000 aircraft held in storage.125
The president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov,
however, listening to his own “different drummer,” has
followed a unique path within Central Asia. Ashgabat set
up its own Ministry of Defense Affairs (January 27, 1992)
and created a ceremonial National Guard (October 1991),
following the pattern of its neighbors. But after
Turkmenistan refused to sign the CIS Accord, Niyazov
replaced it with a bilateral Russo-Turkmen Agreement of
July 1992 by which formations and units on Turkmen soil
would be under Russo-Turkmen “joint jurisdiction.” The
Russian Defense Ministry would retain sole control over
certain air defense and long-range bomber units; the
Turkmen Defense Minister 126 would coordinate the
activities of armed forces deployed on the territory of
Turkmenistan, as well as liaison with the military
departments of other CIS states and the CIS command.
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This integrated joint command did not last long. Joint
command ended in January 1994, although Russia retains a
representative on Turkmenistan’s Defense and National
Security Council at the Turkmen MOD and the Commander
of Russian Border Guard Forces.127 By September 1993,
Ashgabat had signed a bilateral agreement with Moscow to
bring armed forces in Turkmenistan back under Ashgabat’s
control. The approximately 2,000 Russian officers in
Turkmenistan could voluntarily continue to serve on a contract basis, but the majority left when their contracts ended.
With the failure of joint command, a series of bilateral
agreements reaffirmed Moscow’s role as partner and
quasi-patron.128 A naval agreement extended Russian use
of facilities at Krasnovodsk for use by warships of both
nations, promised creation of combined naval units, and
proposed joint naval exercises. Both countries agreed to set
up a training center for pilots and aviation technicians. A
December 1993 agreement establishing the principle of
“dual nationality” sought to ease the fears of serving
Russian officers.129 Ashgabat also signed a 1993 treaty
providing the legal basis for the dispatch, if necessary, of
Russian troops to defend Turkmenistan’s border with Iran
and Afghanistan.130
Russia also assumed responsibility for protecting
Turkmenistan’s 2,300-kilometer border with Iran and
Afghanistan. Ashgabat originally announced creation of its
own border forces, but that proved too much for
Turkmenistan’s manpower and financial resources, given
the porous nature of its southern border and civil war in
Afghanistan.131 An August 27, 1992, Russo-Turkmen
agreement on border cooperation placed all Russian and
Turkmen border units under a provisional joint
Russo-Turkmen Border Command to remain in effect for 5
years, during which Russia would assist in the development
of indigenous border forces. This force, too, proved unable to
control the spread of drugs and arms throughout the area;
thus, in 1995, an “Operational Group of Russian Border
Troops on the Territory of Turkmenistan” was established
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to assist the Turkmen Border Troops along the southern
border.132 Since January 1, 1994, Ashgabat has been paying
the entire cost of Russia’s military expenses on its
territory.133
Turkmenistan, however, is not a puppet of Moscow and
has asserted its independence on several occasions.
Turkmenistan signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Russia in September 1992—but only after
Ashgabat refused to ratify the Tashkent collective security
agreement that May.134 Turkmenistan still has not ratified
the treaty and is merely a “participant” without full rights.
Ashgabat refuses to send delegates to CIS meetings except
those concerning drugs and international crime. Since it did
not approve the Tashkent Accord, Turkmenistan did not
send peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan.
Instead, Turkmenistan identifies itself as a nonaligned
nation, free and able to enter into associations with all
states.135 At the Helsinki summit in July 1992, Niyazov
announced a policy of “positive neutrality,” noninterference
in the affairs of others, and cooperation.136 Niyazov even
took this doctrine to the U.N. General Assembly, which in
December 1995 approved a resolution on the “Permanent
Neutrality of Turkmenistan.137 In his mind this perhaps
resembles international guarantees for Belgium’s
neutrality in the 19th century. Niyazov appears to envision
that Turkmenistan now possesses security guarantees
through the United Nations. However, U.N. assurances are
notoriously thin bonds upon which to stake national
survival.
Under positive neutrality, Turkmenistan has been free
to enter into a variety of military, political, and economic
relationships. Niyazov has stated that Turkmenistan will
not join any military bloc—but can continue to accept
Russian military assistance without compromising its
sovereignty or independence.138 Turkmenistan became the
first Central Asian state to join Partnership for Peace in
May 1994 (although it has been slow to actually participate
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in activities). Ashgabat also agreed to joint maneuvers with
Iran and signed a series of military cooperation agreements
with Teheran, including the “exchange of experience in the
construction and development of armed forces” and the
exchange of military delegations.139 Turkmenistan has also
explored economic and military ties with its neighbors in
the Caucasus and Ukraine.
Ashgabat claims its policy is a success. Turkmenistan
has experienced the least drop in its Gross Domestic
Product since 1989; of course, it also had the lowest
standard of living within the USSR in 1989. Nevertheless,
the Turkmen argue that positive neutrality has allowed the
country to invest “not in an enormous military arsenal, but
in the construction of the civilian infrastructure that will
eventually become the foundation of the national economy,”
and has allowed it to maintain friendly relations
simultaneously with the United States, Iran, Pakistan,
Russia, Turkey, and France even as they disagree with each
other.140
In sum, recognizing that its small forces are incapable of
protecting its vast expanse, Turkmenistan has sought
limited bilateral support from Russia and security through
its proclaimed nonaligned status. It has worked to develop
the infrastructure needed to impress serious investors (a
modern airport, hotels at international standard). Moscow
wields considerable influence, but Ashgabat has attempted
to ingratiate itself with all sides.
UZBEKISTAN—MALL ANCHOR STORE?
Uzbekistan has been the most successful of the Central
Asian countries in creating viable armed forces and, as
such, has produced the most independent security policy in
Central Asia.
Tashkent created a Ministry of Defense Affairs and
appointed the first Defense Minister in September 1991.141
On January 14, 1992, Uzbekistan assumed jurisdiction over
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all former Soviet units and installations deployed on its soil,
with the exception of those strategic forces retained under
the CIS unified command. A National Border Guard force
took over from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops
District, and a National Guard142 replaced former Soviet
Interior (internal security) troops.143 By July 1992, when it
was apparent that a CIS unified command would not
prevail, the Uzbek legislature approved a series of draft
laws that laid the framework for the Uzbek military.144 A
new military oath to the “people” and President of the
Republic of Uzbekistan was first administered in July
1992.145
Conventional armed forces, numbering perhaps
65,000-70,000, under a MOD staff derived from the
headquarters of the Soviet Army’s Turkestan Military
District, are the largest in Central Asia. Forces include two
corps headquarters; two tank divisions; four mechanized
infantry divisions; motorized, air assault, and air mobile
brigades; three artillery, and one multiple rocket launcher
brigades; and an artillery regiment. Equipment includes
370 mostly older model main battle tanks and over 500
towed and self-propelled artillery systems. Nearly 130
combat aircraft and over 40 attack helicopters are in the Air
Force inventory. Added to this are over 15,000 internal
security forces and a National Guard brigade. This is a
formidable force compared to the other Central Asian
republics.146
The Uzbeks are the lone force in Central Asia to develop
a new force structure not based on the old Soviet model. In
1992 the Uzbeks began to reconfigure their ground forces
into a corps-brigade-battalion structure for greater
flexibility.147 Initial planners envisioned two stages for force
development: the first stage (1991 to 1994) to form the
armed forces, install the conscription system, and begin
reform of the force structure and personnel. A second stage
(1995-2000) would finalize structural changes and bring the
armed forces to an end strength of about 70,000.148 That
number has now been halved. The defense budget has been
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hit by inflation, and although the absolute budget has
increased, its actual value has been more than halved.149
Uzbekistan did not inherit a self-sufficient industrial sector,
but several major military complexes did survive, to include
the Chkalov aviation factory producing the IL-76 CANDID
(which Uzbekistan exports to China, Cuba, and Algeria)
and passenger variants.150
With the nationalization of Soviet forces, an overwhelmingly Slavic officer corps and predominantly Uzbek enlisted
forces characterized the Uzbek army.151 But, that soon
shifted as a result of Slavic migration, the Uzbek refusal to
grant dual citizenship, and a concerted government
program to put Uzbek officers in command.152 One means to
acquire senior Uzbek officers was by rejuvenating the
careers of a group of Uzbek officers whose Soviet Army
careers seemingly had dead-ended in the 1980s. For
example, Rustam Akhmedov, a lieutenant colonel with 24
years of service but shunted aside to Civil Defense, was
promoted to Uzbek major general and appointed Defense
Minister. Russians appointed as deputies (including the
Army Chief of Staff) monopolized officer positions in the
short term, but within a year, appointments became more
balanced. Ethnic Slavs who remained accepted Uzbek
citizenship. The officer corps is now about 60 percent Uzbek,
and the percentage of enlisted conscripts at 85 percent make
the Uzbek the most ethnically pure in the former Soviet
Union.
Three major Soviet educational institutions (the
Tashkent Higher All-Arms Command School, the Tashkent
Higher Tank Command School, and the Samarkand Higher
Military Automobile Command), four military lyceum
prep-schools, and the Tashkent Special Military
Gymnasium (Internat) located in Uzbekistan greatly
helped this drive for self-sufficiency in manpower cadres.
Then, in 1994 Uzbekistan established in Tashkent a new
institution, the new Armed Forces Academy, a joint facility
to train officers for brigade- and corps-level command and
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staff assignments. It is the first such Central Asian
institution capable of providing advanced military training.
Uzbekistan issued its own military doctrine in August
1995, in which Tashkent rejected territorial claims on its
neighbors and claimed it would launch military actions only
to defend itself or countries with whom its has mutual
military assistance agreements.153 It supports increasing
the role of the United Nations, active integration into
international and regional security structures, a universal
prohibition of nuclear war (Central Asia should be a
nuclear-free zone), elimination of chemical and biological
weapons, and weapons nonproliferation.154
Uzbekistan’s military policy reflects a more assertive
stance than its neighbors. Tashkent’s new military doctrine
argues that intervention in the affairs of neighboring states
may be justified for the sake of regional stability, not an
empty statement considering its willingness to use military
power vis-à-vis Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the growth
of the armed forces since independence. 155 Though
defensive in nature and opposing war as a means to resolve
international problems, Uzbekistan’s doctrine calls for
maintaining sufficient combat power to guarantee its
territorial integrity, stop encroachments on its sovereignty,
and repel aggression. In war, its armed forces would inflict a
decisive defeat on both the aggressor’s forces and on the joint
military potential of other states linked by relevant
treaties.156 Such assertiveness worries other Central Asian
states, which question Uzbekistan’s long-term goals in the
region and fear Tashkent’s willingness to follow the
so-called “Sinatra Doctrine,” and do things its way.
Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state not to have an
agreement with Russia on joint protection of its “external
borders.” The Uzbek Border Guard Force was first
established on March 24, 1992, as “Border Protection
Troops157 to fight smuggling, the drug trade, and the illegal
transit of emigrants from Asia to Europe, especially in the
region where Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan
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meet.158 A presidential decree created the Main Border
Troops Directorate, headed by a Deputy Chief of the
Republic’s National Security Service (the former Uzbek
Committee on State Security or KGB), and transferred all
units of the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District
to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek National Security Service.159
At independence the Border Guards’ officer corps was
overwhelmingly Slavic, but Tashkent aggressively
produced indigenous forces by organizing special junior
officers courses in which ethnic Uzbek privates,
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and warrant officers
underwent accelerated training and by creating a special
border cadet group at the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms
Command School. The Termez border detachment and a
border brigade with patrol boats guards the 156-kilometer,
riverine border with Afghanistan. Of course, the shortness
of the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border makes its defense
more manageable and allows Uzbekistan to avoid having
Russian border guards on its soil. Uzbekistan also mans 40
border posts along the border with Tajikistan.160
The border Tashkent most fears is that with Tajikistan,
which Tashkent regards as a dagger aimed at the heart of
Uzbekistan.161 Tajikistan was originally part of Soviet
Uzbekistan, and when its borders were drawn to create a
separate Tajik state, large enclaves of Tajiks, including
major cultural centers such as Samarkand and Bokhara,
remained. With Kyrgyzstan, they share the Fergana Valley,
a focus for religious revival and activism. Only 5 percent of
Uzbekistan’s population of 24 million is Tajik, while a
quarter of Tajikistan’s population of 6 million is ethnically
Uzbek. Tashkent is determined to keep Tajikistan’s unrest
from spreading and has ruthlessly suppressed its own
domestic political and religious dissent since Dushanbe’s
cycle of civil war, economic dislocation, ethnic strife, and
external intervention began.
Karimov also identifies the Afghan wars as a real threat
to peace and security in Central Asia and the world because
they have become “a source of international terrorism,
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drug-trafficking, and illegal arms trade, and further
aggravated the already tense situation. . . .” In addition, civil
war there stymied Central Asian states’ projects to build
railroads, pipelines, and roads through Afghanistan to
reach the Indian Ocean.162
Karimov has not just talked about problems “to the
South,” he has taken action. 163 Uzbekistan actively
supported the ethnic Uzbek warlord Dostum in the Afghan
struggle. It sent a 500-man contingent of peacekeepers to
serve in Tajikistan. Where Moscow supports the
Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe with military aid,
Karimov long pushed the Tajik government to meet with
the opposition to negotiate a political end to the trouble.
Tension exists because Moscow regards Tajikistan as its
problem to be solved, while Uzbekistan regards the area
within its own sphere of interest.
Uzbekistan does not border Russia, and that may
influence its ambivalent attitude toward Moscow. In the
early days of independence, Tashkent was a strong
supporter and ally of Russia. Uzbekistan signed bilateral
agreements in May 1992 and March 1994 that granted
Russia extensive privileges and promised to continue
existing ties in the production and supply of weapons,
equipment, spare parts, and accessories and to cooperate in
exporting weaponry and military equipment.164
However, Uzbekistan began to distance itself from
Moscow at mid-decade. With Russia no longer a superpower
and its military reputation tarnished in Chechnya,
Moscow’s influence began to wane. In April 1995 President
Karimov identified “imperialistic ambition rearing up in
Russia” as one of three security issues that could derail
Uzbekistan’s independence.165 Uzbekistan refused to
support Moscow’s rejection of NATO expansion and became
strongly involved in Partnership for Peace. It has delayed
signing recent trade and economic agreements with Moscow
and has worked to develop transportation routes that
bypass the Russian Federation. In November 1996
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Uzbekistan rejected selection of Russian Army General
Mikhail Kolesnikov to be CIS Chief of Staff for Coordinating
Military Cooperation, stating that this “interstate body
should be headed by a representative of a state other than
Russia, a citizen of which has already held this post.”166
Uzbekistan pushed for a negotiated settlement in
Tajikistan and bypassed Moscow to begin diplomatic
initiatives of its own.
This cooling did not go unnoticed. The Russian
nationalist journal Zavtra complained of Tashkent’s
“emphatically pro-West orientation in the economy, the
harsh invective apropos integration treaties in the CIS, the
decisive refusal to join even the Customs Union, and a
methodical anti-Russian nationality policy. . . .”167 Another
observer commented, “The more heartfelt Moscow’s appeals
for closer integration within the CIS became, the more often
Tashkent displayed indifference, or at best, a cool interest
with many reservations.”168
Nevertheless, in speeches Karimov still supports
participation in the CIS and identifies the “key issues” as
the “development and strengthening of equal ties with
sovereign Russia and a reliance on its potential.” 169
Uzbekistan knows that it is not a vital interest of the United
States, but it is a vital interest of Russia. Therefore,
Uzbekistan can remain under the CIS’s collective security
umbrella and still play an increasingly independent role
and evade being drawn into Moscow’s sphere.
At the same time Uzbekistan has developed increasingly
warmer ties with the United States. Originally the United
States was critical of Tashkent’s poor human rights record
and linked financial assistance to Uzbekistan’s progress in
forging democratic institutions.170 But as Uzbekistan grew
in regional importance, the mood in Washington shifted to
fear that the United States would loose influence if it kept
pushing human rights. Following the visit of Defense
Secretary William Perry in April 1995, a sharp shift in
American policy occurred. Uzbekistan allowed a Radio
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Liberty office to open in Tashkent. Uzbekistan joined
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Uzbek contingents
participated in PfP exercises (COOPERATIVE NUGGET in
August 1995 and COOPERATIVE OSPREY in August
1996) in the United States; in September 1996, U.S. forces
trav eled to Uz b eki stan f or Exer c i s e BALAN CE
ULTRA-96.171 American and Uzbek forces have conducted
multinational exercises together including the airborne
jump into Chimkent in 1997. Uzbek officers regularly
attend courses at the Marshall Center in GarmischPartenkirchen, Germany, and in the United States.
President Karimov’s visit to the United States in the
summer of 1996 cemented economic investment and
military cooperation. He signed six contracts worth $200
million, and the United States granted credit of $400 million
for the development of an Uzbek oil and gas complex.172 A
defense conversion program begun in 1995 is studying
(among other projects) conversion of the Chkalov aviation
plant. A joint U.S.-Uzbek committee for the conversion of
Uzbek defense enterprises has been established, and the
U.S. Government-sponsored Overseas Private Investment
Corporation has budgeted $500 million to support joint
ventures.173
At the same time, Tashkent has supported economic,
political, and military integration within Central Asia.
Uzbekistan ratified bilateral military agreements with
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In 1996, Tashkent signed a
border-protection agreement with Ashgabat.174 In January
1997, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan signed a
tripartite treaty declaring “eternal friendship” and
promising to cooperate militarily within a mutual defense
agreement (outside the Tashkent Accord).175 The presidents
of the three states meet regularly at sessions of the
Interstate Council of the Tripartite Central Asian Union to
discuss political problems and economic integration; they
coordinate joint positions before upcoming CIS summits in
Moscow.
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As a result, Washington policymakers began to argue
that the United States needs Uzbekistan as an “island of
stability” between Russia’s regional ambitions from the
north and Islamic fundamentalism from the south.176 In
that sense, Uzbekistan is the “anchor store” for the Central
Asian mall, acting as a strong stabilizer to prevent a Central
Asian political vacuum and a core military force around
which to develop units such as the CENTRAZBAT. An
anchor store, however, is designed to draw in customers
that are then shared by smaller shops in the mall; if it
becomes too overwhelming and monopolizes business,
smaller stores may seek leases elsewhere. A similar
balancing act must occur in Central Asia. A strong
Uzbekistan stabilizes the region; a too strong Uzbekistan
threatens its neighbors and drives them into the arms of
Russia.
WHAT ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE?
The U.S. armed forces were early players in Central
Asia. Military flights carried humanitarian aid and visiting
dignitaries. Moscow’s attaches, experienced travelers to the
region, could easily be dual-accredited. With the downsizing in Europe following the end of the Cold War, the
Central Asian states were an obvious target for stockpiled
military supplies such as field hospitals and food stocks. The
military was a tool immediately at hand that Washington
could use to show the flag; its personnel were trained in
military assistance and it had the means readily available
to project into the region.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to
have a role in Central Asia, but it must be careful that it is
not counterproductive. The DoD can have the greatest
impact on the development of Central Asian armed forces
through military education, military-to-military contact,
arms control and treaty verification, cooperative threat
reduction, and defense conversion.
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Currently, military education for Central Asian armed
forces is channeled through International Military
Education and Training (IMET) Programs which have
exploded over the last 4 years, except in Tajikistan where
none are allotted.177 Under the new “expanded” IMET
concept, Congress mandated that funds be allocated to the
services to develop courses on defense resource management, military justice, civil-military relations, and internationally-recognized human rights. Central Asian officers
attend these courses. Courses also exist to prepare them for
attendance at various Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
Command and General Staff College, and senior service
colleges.178
Military-to-military contact programs for the five
Central Asian states have been ministered by the European
Command (EUCOM) J-5, headquartered in Stuttgart,
Germany.179 EUCOM has used congressionally-mandated
“CINC Initiative Funds” to pay for its military-to-military
programs and PfP activities. EUCOM also administers the
George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, which
presents two 5-month courses a year to teach senior military
officers and civilian officials about defense planning,
organization, and management in democratic societies with
market economies.180
The DoD also plays a major roll in arms control and
treaty verification. The On-Site Inspection Agency
(OSIA)181 engages in a number of inspection and escort
duties that help stabilize Central Asia and reduce the
burden on developing militaries.182
OSIA is active in non-nuclear inspections as well. All five
Central Asian states are signatories of the Vienna
Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (now known as the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) which set
limits on the numbers of military exercises permitted and
establishes methods for cooperation on unusual military
activities, compliance and verification evaluations and
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inspections, and an exchange of annual military activities
calendars, as well as information on military budgets,
defense establishments and military forces; OSIA provides
personnel for OSCE inspections and evaluations.
Kyrgyzstan is a signatory to the Open Skies Treaty (March
24, 1992) which allows reciprocal, unarmed observation
overflights for which OSIA has responsibility. Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan were original signatories in 1993 of the
Chemical Weapons Agreement; inspections will be
conducted with OSIA escorts. OSIA was also given the audit
and examination mission for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program in May 1994; its inspectors conduct audits and
examinations to certify that CTR-related equipment is
being used for its intended purpose.
The initial Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,
co-sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar,
was broadened into the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program (CTRP) after the breakup of the Soviet Union to
provide material assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine with the goals of denuclearization,
demilitarization, and reducing the threat of weapons
proliferation.183 Recently CTRP has expanded beyond its
original mission; CTRP funds are financing a U.S.Kazakhstani joint venture to convert the Semipalatinsk
test site and provide foreign exports from electronic devices
and circuit boards.184
The DoD has also provided funds to convert Central
Asian defense industries for civilian use. Aside from the
Semipalatinsk project already mentioned, under William
Perry the DoD gave Kazakhstan four grants worth $37
million; one such project involved reequipping the
Stepnogorsk chemical plant for the output of civilian
chemical products.185
The programs are coordinated and executed by
American Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) in the region.
Defense Attaches have operated in the region since the
formation of the republics. Initially personnel from the
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embassy in Moscow visited periodically, then beginning in
January 1993 they were augmented by Foreign Area
Officers on short-term temporary duty serving as interim
attaches. The first permanent attache office opened in
Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 1994.186 The last Central Asian
office, in Ashgabat, is slated to formally open in 1998.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES:
REGIONAL REACTION
Beyond the immediate impact of American aid to the
armed forces of these republics, the United States must take
caution that its military operations in Central Asia do not
alienate or threaten other regional powers. A negative
reaction by China, Iran, or Russia could have a much
greater impact upon regional stability than the military
development of these new states.
China.
Proficient armed forces which support political stability,
repress politicized Islam, and safeguard markets would be
welcomed by China. China is developing trade, transportation, and energy links with Central Asia, including a
planned pipeline, and is making serious inroads into their
consumer market.187 Thus, in one sense, China should
support American programs to strengthen Central Asian
armed forces. Strong militaries enhance domestic stability
which is in China’s interest, and they likely will not be
perceived by China as a threat.
Beijing’s greatest internal security challenge is in its
predominantly Muslim Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous
Region—comprising one-sixth of China’s territory—which
borders Central Asia. Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan and
Xinjiang share an ethnic Kazakh/Kyrgyz-Uigher heritage.
Almaty/Bishkek and Beijing share a fear of militant Islam.
Therefore, China appreciates Bishkek’s and Almaty’s
restraint from allowing their states to become a crossborder safe haven or breeding ground for the militants
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responsible for several recent acts of terrorism in Xinjiang.
Improved security forces and border forces play an
important role in that prohibition.
On the surface, therefore, American support to
developing Central Asian militaries would be seen as a
positive force in the region. But, on the other hand, such
programs could harken back to earlier security groupings by
which Washington sought to “contain” China along its
periphery. With the breakup of the USSR, weak Central
Asian indigenous forces and a strategic buffer zone replaced
the forward basing of the Soviet Army and border guard
forces antagonistic to China’s interests. America’s motives
in creating defense ties with the Central Asian states could
be misinterpreted, especially if overall Sino-American
relations deteriorate.
Iran.
Teheran has vital interests in maintaining regional
peace and stability, but its international isolation and
pariah status prevent direct action in support of its genuine
security concerns. Iran shares its ethnicity and Shi’ite faith
with Tajikistan (the other Central Asian states are
ethnically Turkic and Sunni), but Iran still shares historic
ties and economic interests. Iran has refrained from
spreading politicized Islam and from sponsoring overt
missionary efforts; Teheran has worked instead to focus on
developing trade ties with the region. Iran wants to exploit
its geographical location as a transportation route and land
corridor to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; for example,
it constructed a rail link from Turkmenistan that allows
Central Asia to bypass Russian rail routes. Ashgabat also
will open the first Turkmen pipeline south into Iran
(Korpedzhe-Kurtkoy) later this year. A joint commission on
economic cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran
meets to deal with cooperation in the oil and gas sector,
power engineering, agriculture, transportation, communications, trade, and banking contacts.188 Increased trade and
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investment within Central Asia (especially Turkmenistan)
offer Teheran an opportunity to reconstruct its own
war-ravaged and constricted economy, increase foreign
trade, and play a leadership role within the Islamic trade
organization, ECO, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC).
The strengthening of Central Asian militaries will
promote regional political stability, which will enhance
Iran’s long-term economic goals for the region. But,
America’s motives are also suspect in Teheran. Teheran
may assume that efforts by Washington to strengthen
Central Asian militaries are targeted at Iran. A regional
grouping built around Uzbekistan might provide a military
counterweight to Iran. Central Asian participation in PfP
also increases the role of Iran’s rival and western neighbor,
Turkey, which is the “point-man” for the program; Turkey
and Iran are traditional political and economic rivals for
influence in the region.189 If Iran feels threatened by these
actions, it may drive it even closer to Russia.
Russia.
Moscow also views with suspicion any efforts to usurp its
position as hegemon in Central Asia. The inability of most
Central Asian states to develop viable armed forces
provided the context for Russia’s reassertion of its interests
in the region. Moscow’s stated goal to boost integration
envisions Russia as the godfather of Central Asian
militaries—not the United States.
Leadership in the CIS, however, is both a blessing and a
burden. Peacekeeping in Tajikistan overstretched scarce
resources, but Russia’s self-image as a “great power”
demanded that it manage the violence. Russia’s “strategic
denial” precludes involvement by neighbors who wish to
extend their own influence, but Russia’s continuing
economic dislocation makes it very difficult to maintain
facilities and implement agreements. The fear by some
Russians that Washington is waiting in the wings to usurp
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Moscow’s role in Central Asia overstates America’s desire or
ability to assume responsibility for Central Asian security,
but it still acts as an potential irritant in the framework of
U.S.-Russian political affairs. This is especially true as
Russia watches NATO enlargement with resentment and
distrust. Increased American military involvement in
Central Asia seems to bracket Russia between a concerted
U.S. effort to increase its authority in Central and Eastern
Europe, Ukraine, and Central Asia—all at Moscow’s
expense.
The great problem of such an analysis is that it could
result in Moscow searching for new allies to defend itself
against such a perceived danger. Several observers in
Central Asia have expressed fear that NATO enlargment
will prod Russia to continue efforts to improve its ties with
China and Iran. Many have voiced the fear that Moscow
might create a new tripartitite alliance bloc among the three
states in the 21st century, and that Central Asia would find
itself sandwiched in the middle. 190 This is not an
ungrounded fear. Russian journalist Vsevolod Ovchinnikov
argues that shortsighted actions on Washington’s part are
prompting Moscow and Beijing to shift their emphasis from
bilateral to geopolitical aspects of cooperation.
Moscow is concerned about efforts to extend NATO’s
infrastructure to Russia’s present borders. Beijing is alarmed
by attempts to lend an anti-Chinese thrust to the AmericanJapanese security system and other bilateral military ties from
the cold war era.191

A new geopolitical landscape is taking shape, he argues,
one in which Russia and China are becoming the other’s
strategic rear and renewing their alliance of the 1950s.192
America’s Response.
The United States must be extremely careful to what
degree and at what pace it assists the development of
Central Asian militaries, or the “law of unexpected
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consequences” may ricochet with a vengeance. The United
States should focus on quality of life issues, training,
education, senior executive development, defense
conversion, and arms control. For example, one reform
which could revolutionize these forces is the development of
a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
Stricter control in the barracks would alleviate bullying and
ethnic tension; stricter control in the field would improve
operational readiness. Senior executive development
through attendance at schools such as the Marshall Center
supports civilian control of defense instrastructure and
trains senior leaders to work under legislative oversight.
Washington should push qualitative instititional reforms
such as defense transparency and accountable defense
budgets.
The United States should not actively seek to sell arms
to Central Asian militaries to replace Soviet equipment and
bring about standardization with NATO. Nor should
Washington support the efforts by these nations to gain
export currency by becoming arms exporters themselves.
Retaining Soviet equipment ensures abundant spare parts
and interoperability. Central Asian economies cannot
afford a wasteful arms race to buy the newest and most
expensive military gadgets on the world arms market.
The United States must sponsor both bilateral and
multilateral programs. Bilateral pairings, for example,
between various states’ National Guards and individual
Central Asian republics focus military-to-military contact.
Inclusive multinational programs such as recent field
exercises involving Russia, Central Asian, and NATO
nations (e.g., Turkey) are a valuable tool; they are
nonthreatening to other regional powers (especially if they
are included) and promote regional cooperation.
CONCLUSION
When the republics of Central Asia became independent,
they already had in place an administrative infrastructure
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from the Soviet era; even if that political structure was a
sham, it did make transition easier. The same cannot be
said for the economic and military infrastructures in which
all decisions were disseminated from the center. Industries
and military units were spread across the Central Asian
landscape based on a master plan in Moscow that did not
involve promoting republican self-sufficiency in military
affairs.
It is not surprising, therefore, that most Central Asian
states initially preferred some form of unified command in
which their deficiencies would be compensated by the
greater whole and their external defense could become
someone else’s burden. All were perfectly willing to allow
Russia, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to retain the
bulk of the responsibility. Chechnya was a shock and a
wake-up call for Central Asia as well as Russia. Thus,
external events forced each state to create independent
armed forces even as they began to discern weaknesses in
the Russian Army and question its ability to realize all of its
promises. Although the Central Asian states originally
were willing to let Russia assert some authority within the
region and provide trained forces for border duty, each
began to seek alternative sources for their national security.
It was readily apparent that in most cases their own
militaries could not foot the bill. Lacking trained cadres,
training facilities, equipment, spare parts, an industrial
base, and financial resources to support it all, development
of Central Asian militaries has been slow—with an eye on
retaining what each inherited from the Soviet Army rather
than creating anything new. Finally, leaders prefer to
apportion scarce resources to address competing social,
economic, and environmental crises that threaten the very
fabric of society over the development and funding of armed
forces in the absense of an overt threat.
America has national interests in Central Asia, but it
will not assume responsibility for Central Asia’s security.
The United States does not oppose the voluntary formation
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of collective security agreements that maintain stability in
the region, but prefers that the Central Asian states develop
military institutions that allow them options other than
reliance upon Moscow in their security policy formation.
The primary focus of the United States will be damage
control—to prevent existing problems from escalating into
crises that might engage Russia, China, or Iran. The United
States does not want Central Asia to become a breeding
ground for politicized Islam, ethnic hatred, arms
proliferation, drug production, political extremism, or any
other transnational threat that would destabilize the
region.193
The United States should continue to support the
development of Central Asian militaries through military
education, military-to-military contact, arms control and
treaty compliance, cooperative threat reduction, and
defense conversion. But, we must work to ensure that our
efforts do not provoke a negative reaction from regional
neighbors and destabilize the balance of interests currently
at play.
There is a wide variance among the Central Asian states
regarding ability to assure their own national security.
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are consumers, rather than
providers, of security. Kyrgyzstan has attempted to
transition to a provider of security through its economic,
political, and military cooperation with Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
Regardless of their methodology, however, each retains
military ties with Russia. There is nothing inherently
wrong with the Central Asian states using the CIS as a
collective security tool. There is nothing inherently wrong
with Russia taking a role in this process. But, we must
ensure that collective security is just that—collective.
“Breaking away from the Bear” could actually strengthen
security in Central Asia if the militaries of the Central
Asian states develop to a level that they are players in the
game and not just pawns of Moscow.
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Fund

Total
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